# 1AC

## 1AC Plan

The United States federal government should substantially increase cooperative investment in land ports of entry with Mexico.

## 1AC Congestion

The manufacturing sector is growing but it’s a question of sustainability

Curtin 12– Staff Writer for CNBC News and the Daily Ticker (Stacy, 10/17/12, “Manufacturing 'Recovery' Not All It's Cracked Up to Be?,” http://www.cnbc.com/id/49448048)

While proposals by both candidates aim to build a more robust manufacturing sector, those types of jobs account for only 9% of the total U.S. workforce. That number is likely to grow according to estimates by the Boston Consulting Group, which projects 5 million manufacturing and supporting jobs will return home over the next 10 years largely to due rising production and labor costs in emerging markets like China. But is this recovery in manufacturing sustainable? Harvard Business School professors Gary Pisano and Willy Shih do not believe it is. They joined The Daily Ticker's Aaron Task to discuss their new book "Producing Prosperity: Why America Needs a Manufacturing Renaissance" which underscores how important a strong manufacturing base is for American innovation. "I think we've seen obviously some shorter-term blips, if you will, in the last year or so," says Pisano. "They are good, but I would not get overly excited that that is suggesting some big structural long-term change." While there may be a slight uptick in the level of manufacturing jobs, the professors are quick to note that the type of jobs that left the U.S. are not the ones that are coming back. "They are low-skilled, lower wage jobs," Pisano says of the jobs that are returning. If wages are to grow, the nation needs to be involved in more sophisticated manufacturing that other countries cannot do.

Border congestion makes the relationship unsustainable — the plan boosts U.S. manufacturing and overall competitiveness

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Commerce between the United States and Mexico is one of the great — yet underappreciated — success stories of the global economy. In 2011 U.S.-Mexico goods and services trade reached the major milestone of one-half trillion dollars with virtually no recognition. The United States is Mexico's top trading partner, and Mexico — which has gained macroeconomic stability and expanded its middle class over the last two decades — is the United States' second largest export market and third largest trading partner. Seventy percent of bilateral commerce crosses the border via trucks, meaning the border region is literally where "the rubber hits the road" for bilateral relations. This also means that not only California and Baja California, but also Michigan and Michoacán, all have a major stake in efficient and secure border management. The quantity of U.S.-Mexico trade is impressive, but its quality makes it unique. The United States and Mexico do not just sell goods to one another, they actually work together to manufacture them. Through production sharing, materials and parts often cross back and forth between factories on each side of the border as a final product is made and assembled. As a result, U.S. imports from Mexico contain, on average, 40 percent U.S. content, and Mexico's imports from the U.S. also have a high level of Mexican content. This system of joint production has two important consequences. First, it means that our economies are profoundly linked. We tend to experience growth and recession together, and productivity gains or losses on one side of the border generally cause a corresponding gain or loss in competitiveness on the other side as well. Second, the fact that goods often cross the border several times as they are being produced creates a multiplier effect for gains and losses in border efficiency. Whereas goods from China only go through customs and inspection once as they enter the U.S. or Mexico, products built by regional manufacturers bear the costs of long and unpredictable border wait times and significant customs requirements each time they cross the U.S.-Mexico border. Corridors in Crisis This trade relationship requires major infrastructure to function effectively. The largest trade corridor, often referred to as the NASCO corridor, links central and eastern Mexico to Texas, the American Midwest, Northeast, and Ontario, utilizing the key Laredo-Nuevo Laredo ports of entry (POEs). Other important trade arteries include the CANAMEX Corridor, which connects western Mexico to the intermountain United States and Canadian province of Alberta, as well as the shorter but high-volume I-5 corridor connecting California to Baja California. As the economies of both the U.S. and Mexico grow, it is likely that this network of freight transportation infrastructure — and the land POEs that serve as nodes in this network — will experience added stress. Unfortunately, the infrastructure and capacity of the ports of entry to process goods and individuals entering the United States has not kept pace with the expansion of bilateral trade or the population growth of the border region. Instead, the need for greater border security following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to a thickening of the border, dividing the twin cities that characterize the region and adding costly, long and unpredictable wait times for commercial and personal crossers alike. Congestion acts as a drag on the competitiveness of the region and of the United States and Mexico in their entirety. Solutions are needed that strengthen both border security and efficiency at the same time. The integrated nature of the North American manufacturing sector makes eliminating border congestion an important way to enhance regional competitiveness. The global economic crisis forced manufacturers to look for ways to cut costs. After taking into consideration factors such as rising fuel costs, increasing wages in China and the ability to automate an ever greater portion of the production process, many American companies decided to nearshore factories to Mexico or reshore them to the United States, taking advantage of strong human capital and shorter supply chains. Bilateral trade dropped significantly during the recession but has since rebounded strongly, growing significantly faster than trade with China. But the growth of trade continues to add pressure on the already strained POEs and transportation corridors. Several studies have attempted to quantify the costs of border area congestion to the economies of the United States and Mexico. In what is perhaps a testimony to the fragmented and geographically disperse nature of the border region, most of these studies have focused on particular North-South corridors of traffic and trade rather than taking a comprehensive, border-wide approach. The specific results of the studies (see table on p. 108) are quite varied. Nonetheless, one message comes through quite clearly — long and unpredictable wait times at the POEs are costing the United States and Mexican economies many billions of dollars each year. Moderate investments to update infrastructure and to fully staff the ports of entry are certainly needed, as long lines and overworked staff promote neither efficiency nor security. But in a time of tight federal budgets, asking for more resources cannot be the only answer. Strategic efforts that do more with less, improving efficiency and reducing congestion, are also needed. Trusted traveler and shipper programs (i.e. the Global Entry programs, which includes programs such as SENTRI, FAST, C-TPAT) allow vetted, low-risk individuals and shipments expedited passage across the border. Common Voice Improving these programs and significantly expanding enrollment could increase throughput with minimal investments in infrastructure and staffing — all while strengthening security by giving border officials more time to focus on unknown and potentially dangerous individuals and shipments. The development of the 21st Century Border initiative by the Obama and Calderón administrations has yielded some advances in this direction, but the efforts need to be redoubled. The 1990s were the decade of NAFTA and skyrocketing trade. The 2000s saw security concerns grow and recession struck. The new decade has only just begun, but the potential is there for a resurgence of competitiveness and regional integration. There are strong ideas — including trusted traveler and shipper programs, preclearance, customs harmonization, and public-private partnerships — that have enormous potential.

Modernizing border infrastructure solves — safeguards competitiveness, bolsters manufacturing, and supports 6 million U.S. jobs

NAFTA Works 13 (a monthly newsletter on NAFTA and related issues (NAFTA Works, Volume 18, Issue 4, April 2013, “Border Infrastructure's Key Role in Expanding U.S.-Mexico Trade”, <http://www.naftamexico.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/apr13.pdf>, Accessed 07-21-2013 | AK)

Very few countries in the world have the potential to shape the United States’ manufacturing competitiveness as much as Mexico. It is difficult to overstate the critical importance of this strategic partnership, as trade between both countries reached roughly half a trillion dollars in 2012, maintaining Mexico’s status as the U.S.’ third largest trading partner and its second largest export market as it purchased nearly 1/8 of all U.S. exports. The increased usage of cross-border production lines has resulted in a very unique trading partnership, where working to establish a trade facilitating border infrastructure is now crucial to successfully competing in the global market. In order to understand the true strength of this partnership, a new approach that incorporates the relevance of foreign value-added in exports is required. Consequently, one of the most distinctive factors of U.S.-Mexico trade lies in its qualitative nature. Working together to co-manufacture products entails an intensive intra-industry trade of inputs rather than exclusively trading in finished products, helping to support the 6 million U.S. jobs that depend on trade with Mexico. As a result of this highly integrated production process, on average, 40% of all content in Mexican exports to the U.S. actually originates in the United States. As 82%, or $404 billion, of bilateral trade was carried across the border via surface transportation in 2012, improving the efficiency of trade flows at the U.S. southern Ports of Entry (POE) is imperative to safeguarding a regional competitive edge. Last year, over 44 million tons of food, inputs, components, and finished products crossed by land from Mexico into the U.S. to supply manufacturing plants and supermarkets alike. Far from exclusively benefiting the four Southern U.S. states bordering Mexico, a total of twenty-nine U.S. states had exports to Mexico in excess of $1 billion in 2012, making this one of the most economically significant borders in the world. Additionally, some twenty-three U.S. states depended on Mexico as their No. 1 and No. 2 largest export market in 2012, with states as far north as Michigan exporting over $10 billion. This illustrates that even states’ local economies that are far from the southern border are also major stakeholders when it comes to building a seamless, long haul border infrastructure that is capable of minimizing cross-border business costs. Of the 26 POEs along the southern border that collectively handled more than $1.3 billion in bilateral trade each day in 2012 - virtually all of it tariff free - the largest by far is the Port of Laredo in Texas. This critical POE facilitated more than 3.5 million cross-border commercial truck shipments, and over 500 thousand rail-boxes via railway in both directions, carrying more than $163 billion in goods in 2012 or 35% of all bilateral trade. Considering that forty U.S. states spread across the country use Laredo as their primary POE, this port could truly be considered the U.S.’ main artery for bilateral trade with Mexico. Last year alone, more than $76 billion in U.S. exports to Mexico and $86 billion in imported Mexican goods went through the Laredo POE. Another strategic POE is El Paso, which had 13% of all U.S.- Mexico trade pass through in 2012. With over $66 billion in goods being traded here, it is the second busiest port for bilateral trade. As an example of its relevance, El Paso is the second largest POE for U.S. electrical machinery exports to Mexico, as it was responsible for the timely crossing of 26% of this vital industry’s exports. Along the western side of the border, Otay Mesa is the U.S.’ third largest POE for bilateral trade with Mexico, which had more than $35 billion of goods move through this facility in 2012. An astonishing 99% of trade between California and Mexico is conducted by trucks, therefore ensuring that the state’s busiest commercial truck crossing operates at maximum efficiency is critically important. In order to enhance and also secure regional competitiveness, the strength of both countries’ industrial capabilities lies in the joint effort to minimize the logistical costs placed on regional manufactures. By expanding and modernizing the current border infrastructure, both countries promote a world-class logistical capability that improves border wait times, customs procedures, and trusted traveler or shipper programs. As a result, both countries are working together through the 21st Century Border Initiative to address shared challenges. Progress has been achieved over the past three years that has helped to facilitate the secure and efficient flow of goods and people along the border. Three new international bridges, one in Arizona and the other two in Texas, were constructed to support this growing demand. Becoming operational in 2009, the Anzalduas International Bridge in Texas was the first new bridge to be built in over a decade, during which bilateral trade grew by 76%.

Manufacturing spills over – a strong base is key to advanced manufacturing

Lind ’12 **-** Policy director of New America’s Economic Growth Program and a co-founder of the New America Foundation (Michael, “Value Added: America’s Manufacturing Future,” http://growth.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Lind,%20Michael%20and%20Freedman,%20Joshua%20-%20NAF%20-%20Value%20Added%20America%27s%20Manufacturing%20Future.pdf )

Manufacturing, R&D and the U.S. Innovation Ecosystem Perhaps the greatest contribution of manufacturing to the U.S. economy as a whole involves the disproportionate role of the manufacturing sector in R&D. The expansion in the global market for high-value-added services has allowed the U.S. to play to its strengths by expanding its trade surplus in services, many of them linked to manufacturing, including R&D, engineering, software production and finance. Of these services, **by far the most important is R&D.** The United States has long led the world in R&D. In 1981, U.S. gross domestic expenditure on R&D was more than three times as large as that of any other country in the world. And the U.S. still leads: in 2009, the most recent year for which there is available data, the United States spent more than 400 billion dollars. European countries spent just under 300 billion dollars combined, while China spent about 150 billion dollars.14 In the United States, private sector manufacturing is the largest source of R&D. The private sector itself accounts for 71 percent of total R&D in the United States, and although U.S. manufacturing accounts for only 11.7 percent of GDP in 2012, the manufacturing sector accounts for 70 percent of all R&D spending by the private sector in the U.S.15 And R&D and innovation are inextricably connected: a National Science Foundation survey found that 22 percent of manufacturers had introduced product innovations and the same percentage introduced process innovations in the period 2006-2008, while only 8 percent of nonmanufacturers reported innovations of either kind.16 Even as the manufacturing industry in the United States underwent major changes and suffered severe job losses during the last decade, R&D spending continued to follow a general upward growth path. A disproportionate share of workers involved in R&D are employed directly or indirectly by manufacturing companies; for example, the US manufacturing sector employs more than a third of U.S. engineers.17 This means that manufacturing provides much of the demand for the U.S. innovation ecosystem, supporting large numbers of scientists and engineers who might not find employment if R&D were offshored along with production. Why America Needs the Industrial Commons Manufacturing creates an industrial commons, which spurs growth in multiple sectors of the economy through linked industries. An “industrial commons” is a base of shared physical facilities and intangible knowledge shared by a number of firms. The term “commons” comes from communallyshared pastures or fields in premodern Britain. The industrial commons in particular in the manufacturing sector includes not only large companies but also small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which employ 41 percent of the American manufacturing workforce and account for 86 percent of all manufacturing establishments in the U.S. Suppliers of materials, component parts, tools, and more are all interconnected; most of the time, Harvard Business School professors Gary Pisano and Willy Shih point out, these linkages are geographic because of the ease of interaction and knowledge transfer between firms.18 Examples of industrial commons surrounding manufacturing are evident in the United States, including the I-85 corridor from Alabama to Virginia and upstate New York.19 Modern economic scholarship emphasizes the importance of geographic agglomeration effects and co-location synergies. 20 Manufacturers and researchers alike have long noted the symbiotic relationship that occurs when manufacturing and R&D are located near each other: the manufacturer benefits from the innovation, and the researchers are better positioned to understand where innovation can be found and to test new ideas. While some forms of knowledge can be easily recorded and transferred, much “know-how” in industry is tacit knowledge. This valuable tacit knowledge base can be damaged or destroyed by the erosion of geographic linkages, which in turn shrinks the pool of scientists and engineers in the national innovation ecosystem. If an advanced manufacturing core is not retained, then the economy stands to lose not only the manufacturing industry itself but also the geographic synergies of the industrial commons, including R&D. Some have warned that this is already the case: a growing share of R&D by U.S. multinational corporations is taking place outside of the United States.21 In particular, a number of large U.S. manufacturers have opened up or expanded R&D facilities in China over the last few years.22 Next Generation Manufacturing A dynamic manufacturing sector in the U.S. is as important as ever. But thanks to advanced manufacturing technology and technology-enabled integration of manufacturing and services, the very nature of manufacturing is changing, often in radical ways. What will the next generation of manufacturing look like? In 1942, the economist Joseph Schumpeter declared that “the process of creative destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.” By creative destruction, Schumpeter did not mean the rise and fall of firms competing in a technologically-static marketplace. He referred to a “process of industrial mutation— if I may use that biological term—that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating the new one.” He noted that “these revolutions are not strictly incessant; they occurred in discrete rushes that are separated from each other by spaces of comparative quiet. The process as a whole works incessantly, however, in the sense that there is always either revolution or absorption of the results of revolution.”23 As Schumpeter and others have observed, technological innovation tends to be clustered in bursts or waves, each dominated by one or a few transformative technologies that are sometimes called “general purpose technologies.” Among the most world-transforming general purpose technologies of recent centuries have been the steam engine, electricity, the internal combustion engine, and information technology.24 As epochal as these earlier technology-driven innovations in manufacturing processes and business models proved to be, they are rapidly being superseded by new technologydriven changes as part of the never-ending process of Schumpeterian industrial mutation. The latest wave of innovation in industrial technology has been termed “advanced manufacturing.” The National Science and Technology Council of the Executive Office of the President defines advanced manufacturing as “a family of activities that (a) depend on the use and coordination of information, automation, computation, software, sensing, and networking, and/or (b) make use of cutting edge materials and emerging capabilities enabled by the physical and biological sciences, for example, nanotechnology, chemistry, and biology. It involves both new ways to manufacture existing products and the manufacture of new products emerging from new advanced technologies.”25 Already computer-aided design (CAD) and computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) programs, combined with computer numerical control (CNC), allow precision manufacturing from complex designs, eliminating many wasteful trials and steps in finishing. CNC is now ubiquitous in the manufacturing sector and much of the employment growth occurring in the sector requires CNC skills or training. Information technology has allowed for enterprise resource planning (ERP) and other forms of enterprise software to connect parts of the production process (both between and within a firm), track systems, and limit waste when dealing with limited resources. Other areas in which advanced manufacturing will play a role in creating new products and sectors and changing current ones **are: Supercomputing**. **America’s global leadership in technology depends in part on whether the U.S. can compete with Europe and Asia in the race to develop “exascale computing**,” a massive augmentation of computer calculating power that has the potential to revolutionize predictive sci ences from meteorology to economics. According to the Advanced Scientific Computing Advisory Committee (ASCAC), “If the U.S. chooses to be a follower rather than a leader in exascale computing, we must be willing to cede leadership” in industries including aerospace, automobiles, energy, health care, novel material development, and information technology.26 **Robotics:** The long-delayed promise of robotics is coming closer to fulfillment. Google and other firms and research consortiums are testing robotic cars, and Nevada recently amended its laws to permit autonomous automobiles.27 Amazon is experimenting with the use of robots in its warehouses.28 Nanotechnology may permit manufacturing at extremely small scales including the molecular and atomic levels.29 Nanotechnology is also a key research component in the semiconductor indusmanutry, as government funding is sponsoring projects to create a “new switch” capable of supplanting current semiconductor technology.30 Photonics or optoelectronics, based on the conversion of information carried by electrons to photons and back, has potential applications in sectors as diverse as telecommunications, data storage, lighting and consumer electronics. Biomanufacturing is the use of biological processes or living organisms to create inorganic structures, as well as food, drugs and fuel. Researchers at MIT have genetically modified a virus that generates cobalt oxide nanowires for silicon chips.31 Innovative materials include artificial “metamaterials” with novel properties. Carbon nanotubes, for example, have a strength-to-weight ratio that no other material can match.32 Advanced manufacturing using these and other cuttingedge technologies is not only creating new products and new methods of production but is also transforming familiar products like automobiles. The rapid growth in electronic and software content in automobiles, in forms like GPS-based guidance systems, information and entertainment technology, anti-lock brakes and engine control systems, will continue. According to Ford, around 30 percent of the value of one of its automobiles is comprised by intellectual property, electronics and software. In the German automobile market, electronic content as a share of production costs is expected to rise from 20-30 percent in 2007 to 50 percent by 2020.33

Advanced manufacturing is key to the pharmaceutical industry

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**New manufacturing thrives on and drives innovation**. **Manufacturing is a core component of the nation’s innovation ecosystem**. Firms engaged in manufacturing re-invest a significant portion of revenues in research and development (R&D). **Overall, the manufacturing sector comprises two-thirds of industry investment in R&D and employs nearly 64% of the country’s scientists and engineers**. 10 **Manufacturers also have unique opportunities to apply new technologies for specialized functions and achieve economies of scale at the plant or firm**, 11 **making the return on manufacturing R&D significant**. **The transition to advanced manufacturing will enhance the sector’s role in fostering innovation and developing and commercializing new technologies**. **Advanced manufacturing industries, including** semiconductors, computers, **pharmaceuticals**, clean energy technologies, and nanotechnology, **play an outsized role in generating the new technologies**, products, and processes that drive economic growth. **Advanced manufacturing is also characterized by the rapid transfer of science and technology into manufacturing processes and products, which in and of itself drives innovation**. The research-to-manufacturing process is cyclical, with multiple feedbacks between basic R&D, pre-competitive research, prototyping, product development, and manufacturing. This opens new possibilities for product development and manufacturing. 12

Pharmaceutical advancements solve disease

Dana-Farber, 2002 [Since its founding in 1947, Dana-Farber has been committed to providing cancer patients with the best treatment available today while developing tomorrow's cures through cutting-edge research. Research into rare disease leads to discovery of six new breast cancer-susceptibility genes, June 13, http://www.dana-farber.org/abo/news/press/061302b.asp]

**A decade of research into one of the world's least-known diseases has resulted in a major advance against one of the best-known:** the discovery of six genes linked to inherited breast **cancer.** In a study published online by the journal Science on June 13, investigators at Dana-Farber Cancer Institute and Children's Hospital Boston report that an error in any of the half-dozen genes involved in Fanconi anemia - a rare childhood condition - can increase an individual's chances of developing breast cancer. **The discovery raises the prospect that the ranks of known breast cancer-susceptibility genes -** best known as BRCA1 and BRCA2 **- will soon increase four-fold,** to a total of eight. "Just as women today can be tested for BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations to determine if they have an inherited predisposition for breast cancer, testing for mutations in these other six genes may soon become a routine part of gauging inherited breast cancer risk," says the study's senior author, Alan D'Andrea, MD, of Dana-Farber. **"Women and their doctors can then use the information in deciding how to keep that risk at a minimum." The finding may also spur the development of new treatments capable of preventing or quelling breast cancer in women at risk for the disease. Drugs that can counteract the flaws in specific genes promise to be more effective than therapies that take a more generic approach.** The discovery of the new cancer-susceptibility genes grew out of more than 10 years of research by D'Andrea into Fanconi anemia, a condition known to affect only 500 families in the United States. Children born with the condition usually develop bone marrow failure early in life, leaving them unable to produce oxygen-carrying red blood cells. If they survive into young adulthood - often with the help of a bone marrow transplant - they're at risk for a variety of cancers - most often leukemia, but also tumors of the brain, head and neck, breast, colon, and other parts of the body**. "This work is a prime example of how research into rare conditions can lead to better diagnosis and treatment for people with far more common diseases,"** D'Andrea explains.

H5N1 and other deadly pathogens will escape from BSL-4 labs—the impact is extinction
Wilson 13 (Grant Wilson, Professional Associate at the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, 2013, "Minimizing Global Catastrophic and Existential Risks from Emerging Technologies through International Law," <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179094>, ZS)

An accidental release of a bioengineered microorganism during legitimate research poses a GCR/ER when such a microorganism has the potential to be highly deadly and has never been tested in an uncontrolled environment. The threat of an accidental release of a harmful organism recently sparked an unprecedented scientific debate amongst policymakers, scientists, and the general public in reaction to the creation of an airborne strain of H5N1. In September 2011, Ron Fouchier, a scientist from the Netherlands, announced that he had genetically engineered the H5N1 virus—his lab “mutated the hell out of H5N1,” he professed—to become airborne, which was tested on ferrets; a laboratory at the University of Wisconsin-Madison similarly mutated the virus into a highly transmittable form. The “natural” H5N1 killed approximately sixty percent of those with reported infections (although the large amount of unreported cases means that this is an over estimate), but the total number of fatalities—346 people—was relatively small because the virus is difficult to transmit from human to human. The larger risk comes from the possibility that a mutated virus would spread more easily amongst humans, which could result in a devastating flu pandemic amongst the worst in history, if not the very worst. To put this in context, about one in every fifteen Americans—20 million people—would die every year from a seasonal flu as virulent as a highly transmittable form of H5N1. Lax regulations and a rapidly growing number of laboratories exacerbate the dangers posed by bioengineered organisms. While lab biosafety guidelines in the United States and Europe recommended that projects like reengineering the H5N1 virus be conducted in a BSL-4 facility (the highest security level), neither laboratory that reengineered the H5N1 virus met this non-binding standard. Meanwhile, a 2007 Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) report indicated that BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs are rapidly expanding in the United States. While there is significant public information about laboratories that receive federal funding or are registered with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (“USD”) Select Agent Program, much less is known about the “location, activities, and ownership” of labs that are not federally funded and not registered with the CDC or the USD Select Agent Program. The same report also concluded that no single U.S. agency is responsible for tracking and assessing the risks of labs engaging in bioengineering.

There are no vaccines for H5N1
Begley 12 February 16th, 2012, Sharon Begley, "How secure are labs handling world’s deadliest pathogens?," <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/16/us-health-biosecurity-idUSTRE81E0R420120216>
Last year, labs at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and Erasmus MC in Rotterdam independently created mutant forms of avian influenza, known as H5N1, that can be transmitted directly among mammals. The natural strain can be caught only through close contact with infected birds. One immediate question is what level of safety should be required for that research. So far, it has been conducted at biosafety-level 3 labs. Under U.S. guidelines, BSL-3 applies to agents that cause "serious or lethal disease" but do not ordinarily spread between people and for which treatments or preventives exist. BSL-4 applies to agents with no preventives or treatment. Locations of selected, operational BSL-4 lab facilities: The Wisconsin and Erasmus scientists received approval to conduct their experiments under BSL-3 conditions because, they argued, antiviral drugs can treat avian flu. Erasmus was subject to U.S. guidelines because its experiments were funded by the National Institutes of Health. "The viruses generated here are sensitive to influenza antivirals" so they fit the BSL-3 criteria, said Rebecca Moritz of the University of Wisconsin's Office of Biological Safety. There are "multiple physical barriers and the facilities are monitored at all times." All lab workers there wear disposable jumpsuits and powered respirators in addition to scrubs, shoes, shoe covers, and double gloves, she said. Each time scientists leave the lab, they must remove their protective equipment and shower before putting on their street clothes. Erasmus does the same. The labs said they have emergency and security plans for a wide variety of threats. Neither would provide specifics on those security measures on the grounds the details could aid any would-be attackers. Such precautions are not foolproof, however. According to a 2009 report by the Government Accountability Office, there were 400 accidents at BSL-3 labs in the United States in the previous decade. Some scientists therefore argue that the experiments creating contagious H5N1 mutants should be done only at BSL-4 facilities. "An escape would still produce the worst pandemic in history," said Michael Osterholm of the University of Minnesota and a member of the NSABB, at a symposium at the New York Academy of Sciences this month.

Drug-resistant TB strains are developing in Mexico—spreads quickly and is airborne
WSJ 13 (Wall Street Journal, International News Source, “Risk of Deadly TB Exposure Grows Along U.S.-Mexico Border,” <https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/tb-roundtable/N3ec0AnfzZA>, ZS)
The Tijuana General Hospital TB Clinic in Mexico is working to treat drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis. Many people with the deadly disease enter the U.S. from Mexico. WSJ's Betsy McKay reports. Photo: Sandy Huffaker/The Wall Street Journal To this day, it isn't clear if he infected anyone on either side of the border while he was contagious. But his tale illustrates a nagging concern among health officials who say the 2,000-mile border between the U.S. and Mexico could become a breeding ground for one of the hardest forms of TB to treat. Already, both California and Texas, as well as some states on the Mexico side of the border, have unusually high rates of drug-resistant TB. "This is a very hot region" for drug-resistant TB, said Rafael Laniado-Laborin, chief of Tijuana General Hospital's tuberculosis clinic and laboratory, who has had an influx of new patients recently—including one who recently returned from the U.S. and is in the middle of treatment. With tuberculosis of any form, people can get around until the disease is quite advanced. "You will go and work and move around," he said. "You will transmit the disease before you know you're sick." To be sure, the actual number of cases in the U.S. and Mexico is still small and the rates of multidrug-resistant TB—or MDR—are nowhere near as severe as India, China, or Eastern Europe, where drug-resistant TB is at epidemic proportions. In 2011, the most recent year available, Mexico had 467 MDR-TB cases, the World Health Organization estimates, while the U.S. had 124, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Almost half of the U.S. cases came from California and Texas. Health officials say it is crucial to jump on prevention now, because the disease is transmitted airborne and can spread quickly. "We're all connected by the air we breathe," said Thomas Frieden, director of the CDC, and a TB expert who successfully battled a major outbreak of multidrug-resistant TB in New York City in the 1990s, then spearheaded India's TB-fighting program for the World Health Organization

And, XDR TB spread risks becoming a pandemic—puts the global population at risk
Bio Medicine 7 (Internet’s Leading online organization devoted to biology and medicine, “The Dreaded Disease Tuberculosis Raises Its Ugly Head”, <http://www.bio-medicine.org/medicine-news/The-Dreaded-Disease-Tuberculosis-Raises-Its-Ugly-Head-20674-1/>, ZS)
When Mr. Andrew Speaker and his wife returned to United States from Europe they were immediately quarantined by the health officials . Speaker and his family have been fighting back ever since, disputing the accounts of government health officials who contended he had been warned not to fly because he posed an infection risk to others. The disease in Speaker came to fore when he went for a check up for a rib injury. His X-ray picked up shadow in his right lung and TB was suspected. Only after intense test it was realized that the TB was drug resistance. But Speaker was not aware of it till late. Until a few weeks ago, many Americans had never heard of extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis, or XDR-TB. But Speaker got plenty of press as he was ordered into federal quarantine, having crisscrossed the Atlantic on commercial flights while infected with extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB). In the 1970s, eradicating TB appeared possible. Now, the drug-resistant strains are winning. Of the 9 million new TB cases each year, an estimated 450,000 are multi-drug resistant, or MDR. Only two-thirds of MDR TB patients are cured. The World Health Organization estimates that in 2005, there were 27,000 cases in 37 countries of XDR TB, which is resistant to at least three of the six second-line drugs used when the first drugs fail. The cure rate for XDR TB patients is just one-third. Scariest of all, two women in Italy recently died from a fully resistant type of TB that's officially incurable. (Scientists are dubbing it XXDR TB.) Today, TB terrorizes those whose immunity has been weakened by HIV, hunger, alcoholism or other diseases. If the new strains become dominant, everyone is at risk. The rising worldwide number of XDR-TB cases like Speaker's may herald the end of a glorious 60-year holiday from many common and highly contagious diseases -- such as polio, measles and cholera -- that once routinely ravaged vast swaths of humanity. Ironically, there has long been a disturbing tendency to romanticize the white plague, as tuberculosis is also known. But in real life, tuberculosis is a messy, agonizing and debilitating ordeal. Once the tubercle bacilli gain the momentum to proceed unchecked through the body, there is no romance to be found. The actual experience of tuberculosis is one of exhaustion, drenching bouts of sweating, groaning, a cough punctuated by uncontrollable spurts of blood. XDR TB is already too widespread to quarantine. We need to combat it globally before it becomes pandemic. Last week, the WHO asked governments worldwide to pay up the $3 billion a year needed to fund existing TB programs and an additional $1 billion a year to combat XDR TB. In the U.S., Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) and others proposed spending $300 million on TB next year, much of it on research. Given that isolating and treating a single XDR patient can cost up to $250,000, the case for spending far more on prevention and control is self-evident. Today, more than one-third of the world's more than 6 billion people have been exposed to the tuberculosis germ. Five to 10 percent of them, or at least 100 million, will develop symptomatic TB. Each will infect 10 to 20 people before they are either successfully treated or they die. Last year, active -- and contagious -- tuberculosis was diagnosed in more than 8.8 million people. Approximately 420,000, or 5 percent, of them have a drug-resistant strain that requires several more medications than drug-sensitive cases do; about 30,000 of these 420,000 cases are even more difficult and expensive to treat, the highly lethal XDR-TB.

Disease causes extinction—their defense doesn’t assume mutation, population size, bio-engineering, or globalization
Darling 12 March 18th, 2012, David Darling is a British Astronomer,
 “9 Strange Ways the World Really Might End,” <http://blog.seattlepi.com/thebigblog/2012/03/18/9-strange-ways-the-world-really-might-end/?fb_xd_fragment>
Catastrophometer Scale 7.5: The enemy within (Pandemics) Our body is in constant competition with a dizzying array of viruses, bacteria, and parasites, many of which treat us simply as a source of food or a vehicle for reproduction. What’s troubling is that these microbes can mutate and evolve at fantastic speed – the more so thanks to the burgeoning human population – confronting our bodies with new dangers every year. HIV, Ebola, bird flu, and antibiotic-resistant “super bugs” are just a few of the pathogenic threats to humanity that have surfaced over the past few decades. Our soaring numbers, ubiquitous international travel, and the increasing use of chemicals and biological agents without full knowledge of their consequences, have increased the risk of unstoppable pandemics arising from mutant viruses and their ilk. Bubonic plague, the Black Death, and the Spanish Flu are vivid examples from history of how microbial agents can decimate populations. But the consequences aren’t limited to a high body count. When the death toll gets high enough, it can disrupt the very fabric of society. According to U.S. government studies, if a global pandemic affecting at least half the world’s population were to strike today, health professionals wouldn’t be able to cope with the vast numbers of sick and succumbing people. The result of so many deaths would have serious implications for the infrastructure, food supply, and security of 21st century man. While an untreatable pandemic could strike suddenly and potentially bring civilization to its knees in weeks or months, degenerative diseases might do so over longer periods. The most common degenerative disease is cancer. Every second men and every third women in the western world will be diagnosed with this disease in their lifetime. Degeneration of our environment through the release of toxins and wastes, air pollution, and intake of unhealthy foods is making this problem worse. If cancer, or some other form of degenerative disease, were to become even more commonplace and strike before reproduction, or become infectious (as seen in the transmitted facial cancer of the Tasmanian Devil, a carnivorous marsupial in Australia) the very survival of our species could be threatened.

Burnout theory is false
Casadevall 12 March 21st, 2012, Arturo Casaveall is a professor of Microbiology and Immunology at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Arturo, “The future of biological warfare,”<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/full>
In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Tayloret al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

Advanced manufacturing technology makes war obsolete – it’s the ultimate deterrent

Paone 9 **-** 66th Air Base Wing Public Affairs for the US Air Force (Chuck, 8-10-09, “Technology convergence could prevent war, futurist says,” http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123162500)

The convergence of "exponentially advancing technologies" will form a "super-intelligence" so formidable that it could avert war, according to one of the world's leading futurists. Dr. James Canton, CEO and chairman of the Institute for Global Futures, a San Francisco-based think tank, is author of the book "The Extreme Future" and an adviser to leading companies, the military and other government agencies. He is consistently listed among the world's leading speakers and has presented to diverse audiences around the globe. He will address the Air Force Command and Control Intelligence, Survelliance and Reconnaissance Symposium, which will be held Sept. 28 through 30 at the MGM Grand Hotel at Foxwoods in Ledyard, Conn., joining Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz and a bevy of other government and industry speakers. He offered a sneak preview of his symposium presentation and answered various questions about the future of technology and warfare in early August. "The superiority of convergent technologies will prevent war," Doctor Canton said, claiming their power would present an overwhelming deterrent to potential adversaries. While saying that the U.S. will build these super systems faster and better than other nations, he acknowledged that a new arms race is already under way. "It will be a new MAD for the 21st century," he said, referring to the Cold War-era acronym for Mutually Assured Destruction, the idea that a nuclear first strike would trigger an equally deadly response. It's commonly held that this knowledge has essentially prevented any rational state from launching a nuclear attack. Likewise, Doctor Canton said he believes rational nation states, considering this imminent technology explosion, will see the futility of nation-on-nation warfare in the near future. Plus there's the "socio-economic linking of the global market system." "The fundamental macroeconomics on the planet favor peace, security, capitalism and prosperity," he said. Doctor Canton projects that nations, including those not currently allied, will work together in using these smart technologies to prevent non-state actors from engaging in disruptive and deadly acts. As a futurist, Doctor Canton and his team study and predict many things, but their main area of expertise -- and the one in which he's personally most interested -- is advanced and emerging technology. "I see that as the key catalyst of strategic change on the planet, and it will be for the next 100 years," he said. He focuses on six specific technology areas: "nano, bio, IT, neuro, quantum and robotics;" those he expects to converge in so powerful a way. Within the information technology arena, Doctor Canton said systems must create "meaningful data," which can be validated and acted upon. "Knowledge engineering for the analyst and the warfighter is a critical competency that we need to get our arms around," he said. "Having an avalanche of data is not going to be helpful." Having the right data is. "There's no way for the human operator to look at an infinite number of data streams and extract meaning," he said. "The question then is: How do we augment the human user with advanced artificial intelligence, better software presentation and better visual frameworks, to create a system that is situationally aware and can provide decision options for the human operator, faster than the human being can?" He said he believes the answers can often be found already in what he calls 'edge cultures.' "I would look outside of the military. What are they doing in video games? What are they doing in healthcare? What about the financial industry?" Doctor Canton said he believes that more sophisticated artificial intelligence applications will transform business, warfare and life in general. Many of these are already embedded in systems or products, he says, even if people don't know it.

Manufacturing and defense capabilities control conflict-escalation — makes war obsolete.

O’Hanlon 12 — Michael O’Hanlon, is a senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and director of research for the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American foreign policy. He is a visiting lecturer at Princeton University, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. O’Hanlon is a member of the External Advisory Board at the Central Intelligence Agency (Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings, January 2012, “The Arsenal of Democracy and How to Preserve It: Key Issues in Defense Industrial Policy,” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/26%20defense%20industrial%20base/0126_defense_industrial_base_ohanlon>, Accessed 09-18-2013)

The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely industrial impact, as the U.S. defense industrial base is in a much different place than it was in the past. Defense industrial issues are too often viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in congressional districts. But the overall health of the firms that supply the technologies our armed forces utilize does have national security resonance. Qualitative superiority in weaponry and other key military technology has become an essential element of American military power in the modern era—not only for winning wars but for deterring them. That requires world-class scientific and manufacturing capabilities—which in turn can also generate civilian and military export opportunities for the United States in a globalized marketplace.

Our heuristic is empirically verifiable — deterrence and incentive theory provide an accurate explanation of international relations.

Moore 4 — Director at the Center for Security Law at the University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential Appointee and Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law (John Norton Moore, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, pp. 27-31)

As so broadly conceived, there is strong evidence that deterrence, that is, the effect of external factors on the decision to go to war, is the missing link in the war/peace equation. In my War/Peace Seminar, I have undertaken to examine the level of deterrence before the principal wars of the twentieth century.10 This examination has led me to believe that in every case the potential aggressor made a rational calculation that the war would be won, and won promptly.11 In fact, the longest period of time calculated for victory through conventional attack seems to be the roughly six reeks predicted by the German General Staff as the time necessary ) prevail on the Western front in World War I under the Schlieffen Plan. Hitler believed in his attack on Poland that Britain and France could not take the occasion to go to war with him. And he believed his 1941 Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union that “[w]e have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."12 In contrast, following Hermann Goering's failure to obtain air superiority in the Battle of Britain, Hitler called off the invasion of Britain and shifted strategy to the nighttime bombing of population centers, which became known as the Blitz, in a mistaken effort to compel Britain to sue for peace. Calculations in the North Korean attack on South Korea and Hussein’s attack on Kuwait were that the operations would be completed in a matter of days. Indeed, virtually all principal wars in the twentieth century, at least those involving conventional invasion, were preceded by what I refer to as a "double deterrence absence." That is, the potential aggressor believed that they had the military force in place to prevail promptly and that nations that might have the military or diplomatic power to prevent this were not dined to intervene. This analysis has also shown that many of the perceptions we have about the origins of particular wars are flatly wrong. Anyone who seriously believes that World War I was begun by competing alliances drawing tighter should examine the al historical record of British unwillingness to enter a clear military alliance with the French or to so inform the Kaiser! Indeed, this pre-World War I absence of effective alliance and resultant war contrasts sharply with the later robust NATO alliance and absence of World War III.14 Considerable other evidence seems to support this historical analysis as to the importance of deterrence. Of particular note, Yale Professor Donald Kagan, a preeminent United States historian who has long taught a seminar on war, published in 1995 a superb book On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace.15 In this book he conducts a detailed examination of the Peloponnesian War, World War I, Hannibal's War, and World War II, among other case studies. A careful reading of these studies suggests that each war could have been prevented by achievable deterrence and that each occurred in the absence of such deterrence.16 Game theory seems to offer yet further support for the proposition that appropriate deterrence can prevent war. For example, Robert Axelrod's famous 1980s experiment in an iterated prisoner's dilemma, which is a reasonably close proxy for many conflict settings in international relations, repeatedly showed the effectiveness of a simple tit for tat strategy.17 Such a strategy is at core simply a basic deterrent strategy of influencing behavior through incentives. Similarly, much of the game-theoretic work on crisis bargaining (and danger of asymmetric information) in relation to war and the democratic peace assumes the importance of deterrence through communication of incentives.18 The well-known correlation between war and territorial contiguity seems also to underscore the importance of deterrence and is likely principally a proxy for levels of perceived profit and military achievability of aggression in many such settings. It should further be noted that the democratic peace is not the only significant correlation with respect to war and peace, although it seems to be the most robust. Professors Russett and Oneal, in recently exploring the other elements of the Kantian proposal for "Perpetual Peace," have also shown a strong and statistically significant correlation between economically important bilateral trade between two nations and a reduction in the risk of war between them. Contrary to the arguments of "dependency theorists," such economically important trade seems to reduce the risk of war regardless of the size relationship or asymmetry in the trade balance between the two states. In addition, there is a statistically significant association between economic openness generally and reduction in the risk of war, although this association is not as strong as the effect of an economically important bilateral trade relationship.° Russett and Oneal also show a modest independent correlation between reduction in the risk of war and higher levels of common membership in international organizations.20 And they show that a large imbalance of power between two states significantly lessens the risk of major war between them.21 All of these empirical findings about war also seem to directly reflect incentives; that is, a higher level of trade would, if foregone in war, impose higher costs in the aggregate than without such trade,22 though we know that not all wars terminate trade. Moreover, with respect to trade, a, classic study, Economic Interdependence and War, suggests that the historic record shows that it is not simply aggregate levels of bilateral trade that matters, but expectations as to the level of trade into the future.23 This directly implicates expectations of the war decision maker as does incentive theory, and it importantly adds to the general finding about trade and war that even with existing high levels of bilateral trade, changing expectations from trade sanctions or other factors affecting the flow of trade can directly affect incentives and influence for or against war. A large imbalance of power in a relationship rather obviously impacts deterrence and incentives. Similarly, one might incur higher costs with high levels of common membership in international organizations through foregoing some of the heightened benefits of such participation or otherwise being presented with different options through the actions or effects of such organizations. These external deterrence elements may also be yet another reason why democracies have a lower risk of war with one another. For their freer markets, trade, commerce, and international engagement may place them in a position where their generally higher level of interaction means that aggression will incur substantial opportunity costs. Thus, the "mechanism" of the democratic peace may be an aggregate of factors affecting incentives, both external as well as internal factors. Because of the underlying truth in the relationship between higher levels of trade and lower levels of war, it is not surprising that theorists throughout human history, including Baron de Montesquieu in 1748, Thomas Paine in 1792, John Stuart Mill in 1848, and, most recently, the founders of the European Union, have argued that increasing commerce and interactions among nations would end war. Though by themselves these arguments have been overoptimistic, it may well be that some level of "globalization" may make the costs of war and the gains of peace so high as to powerfully predispose to peace. Indeed, a 1989 book by John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday,24 postulates the obsolescence of major war between developed nations (at least those nations within the "first and second worlds") as they become increasingly conscious of the rising costs of war and the rising gains of peace. In assessing levels of democracy, there are indexes readily available, for example, the Polity III25 and Freedom House 26 indexes. I am unaware of any comparable index with respect to levels of deterrence that might be used to test the importance of deterrence in war avoidance?' Absent such an accepted index, discussion about the importance of deterrence is subject to the skeptical observation that one simply defines effective deterrence by whether a war did or did not occur. In order to begin to deal with this objection and encourage a more objective methodology for assessing deterrence, I encouraged a project to seek to develop a rough but objective measure of deterrence with a scale from minus ten to plus ten based on a large variety of contextual features that would be given relative weighting in a complex deterrence equation before applying the scaling to different war and nonwar settings.28 On the disincentive side of the scale, the methodology used a weighted calculation of local deterrence, including the chance to prevent a short- and intermediate-term military victory, and economic and political disincentives; extended deterrence with these same elements; and contextual communication and credibility multipliers. On the incentive side of the scale, the methodology also used a weighted calculation of perceived military, economic, and political benefits. The scales were then combined into an overall deterrence score, including, an estimate for any effect of prospect theory where applicable.2 This innovative first effort uniformly showed high deterrence scores in settings where war did not, in fact, occur. Deterring a Soviet first strike in the Cuban Missile Crisis produced a score of +8.5 and preventing a Soviet attack against NATO produced a score of +6. War settings, however, produced scores ranging from -2.29 (Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait in the Gulf War), -2.18 (North Korea's decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War), -1.85 (Hitler's decision to invade Poland in World War II), -1.54 (North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords), -0.65 (Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo), +0.5 (the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor), +1.25 (the Austrian decision, egged on by Germany, to attack Serbia, which was the real beginning of World War I), to +1.75 (the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I). As a further effort at scaling and as a point of comparison, I undertook to simply provide an impressionistic rating based on my study of each pre-crisis setting. That produced high positive scores of +9 for both deterring a Soviet first strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis and NATO's deterrence of a Warsaw Pact attack and even lower scores than the more objective effort in settings where wars had occurred. Thus, I scored North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords and the German decision to invade Poland at the beginning of World War II as -6; the North Korean/Stalin decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War as -5; the Iraqi decision to invade the State of Kuwait as -4; Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo and the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I as -2; and the Austrian decision to attack Serbia and the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor as -1. Certainly even knowledgeable experts would be likely to differ in their impressionistic scores on such pre-crisis settings, and the effort at a more objective methodology for scoring deterrence leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, both exercises did seem to suggest that deterrence matters and that high levels of deterrence can prevent future war. Following up on this initial effort to produce a more objective measure of deterrence, two years later I encouraged another project to undertake the same effort, building on what had been learned in the first iteration. The result was a second project that developed a modified scoring system, also incorporating local deterrence, extended deterrence, and communication of intent and credibility multipliers on one side of a scale, and weighing these factors against a potential aggressor's overall subjective incentives for action on the other side of the scale.3° The result, with a potential range of -5.5 to +10, produced no score higher than +2.5 for eighteen major wars studied between 1939 and the 1990 Gulf War.31 Twelve of the eighteen wars produced a score of zero or below, with the 1950-53 Korean War at -3.94, the 1965-75 Vietnam War at -0.25, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War at -1.53, and the 1990-91 Gulf War at -3.83. The study concluded that in more than fifty years of conflict there was "no situation in which a regime elite/decision making body subjectively faced substantial disincentives to aggressive military action and yet attacked."32 Yet another piece of the puzzle, which may clarify the extent of deterrence necessary in certain settings, may also assist in building a broader hypothesis about war. In fact, it has been incorporated into the just-discussed efforts at scoring deterrence. That is, newer studies of human behavior from cognitive psychology are increasingly showing that certain perceptions of decision makers can influence the level of risk they may be willing to undertake, or otherwise affect their decisions.33 It now seems likely that a number of such insights about human behavior in decision making may be useful in considering and fashioning deterrence strategies. Perhaps of greatest relevance is the insight of "prospect theory," which posits that individuals evaluate outcomes with respect to deviations from a reference point and that they may be more risk averse in settings posing potential gain than in settings posing potential loss.34 The evidence of this "cognitive bias," whether in gambling, trading, or, as is increasingly being argued, foreign policy decisions generally, is significant. Because of the newness of efforts to apply a laboratory based "prospect theory" to the complex foreign policy process generally, and particularly ambiguities and uncertainties in framing such complex events, our consideration of it in the war/peace process should certainly be cautious. It does, however, seem to elucidate some of the case studies. In the war/peace setting, "prospect theory" suggests that deterrence may not need to be as strong to prevent aggressive action leading to perceived gain. For example, there is credible evidence that even an informal warning to Kaiser Wilhelm II from British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, if it had come early in the crisis before events had moved too far, might have averted World War I. And even a modicum of deterrence in Kuwait, as was provided by a small British contingent when Kuwait was earlier threatened by an irredentist Iraqi government in 1961, might have been sufficient to deter Saddam Hussein from his 1990 attack on Kuwait. Similarly, even a clear United States pledge for the defense of South Korea before the attack might have prevented the Korean War. Conversely, following the July 28 Austrian mobilization and declaration of war against Serbia in World War I, the issue for Austria may have begun to be perceived as loss avoidance, thus requiring much higher levels of deterrence to avoid the resulting war. Similarly, the Rambouillet Agreement may have been perceived by Milosevic as risking loss of Kosovo and his continued rule of Serbia and, as a result, may have required higher levels of NA-TO deterrence to have prevented Milosevic's actions in defiance. Certainly NATO's previous hesitant responses in 1995 against Milosevic in the Bosnia phase of the Yugoslav crisis and in 1998-99 in early attempts to deal with Kosovo did not create a high level of deterrence.35 One can only surmise whether the killing in Kosovo could have been avoided had NATO taken a different tack, both structuring the issue less as loss avoidance for Milosevic and considerably enhancing deterrence. Suppose, for example, NATO had emphasized that it had no interest in intervening in Serbia's civil conflict with the KLA but that it would emphatically take action to punish massive "ethnic cleansing" and other humanitarian outrages, as had been practiced in Bosnia. And on the deterrence side, it made clear in advance the severity of any NATO bombardment, the potential for introduction of ground troops if necessary, that in any assault it would pursue a "Leadership Strategy" focused on targets of importance to Milosevic and his principal henchmen (including their hold on power), and that it would immediately, unlike as earlier in Bosnia, seek to generate war crime indictments of all top Serbian leaders implicated in any atrocities. The point here is not to second-guess NATO's actions in Kosovo but to suggest that taking into account potential "cognitive bias," such as "prospect theory," may be useful in fashioning effective deterrence. "Prospect theory" may also have relevance in predicting that it may be easier to deter (that is, lower levels are necessary) an aggression than to undo that aggression. Thus, much higher levels of deterrence were probably required to compel Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait than to prevent him initially from invading that state. In fact, not even the presence of a powerful Desert Storm military force and a Security Council Resolution directing him to leave caused Hussein to voluntarily withdraw. As this real-world example illustrates, there is considerable experimental evidence in "prospect theory" of an almost instant renormalization of reference point after a gain; that is, relatively quickly after Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, a withdrawal was framed as a loss setting, which he would take high risk to avoid. Indeed, we tend to think of such settings as settings of compellance, requiring higher levels of incentive to achieve compulsion producing an action, rather than deterrence needed for prevention. One should also be careful not to overstate the effect of "prospect theory" or to fail to assess a threat in its complete context. We should remember that a belated pledge of Great Britain to defend Poland before the Nazi attack did not deter Hitler, who believed under the circumstances that the British pledge would not be honored. It is also possible that the greater relative wealth of democracies, which have less to gain in all out war, is yet another internal factor contributing to the "democratic peace."36 In turn, this also supports the extraordinary tenacity and general record of success of democracies fighting in defensive settings as they may also have more to lose. In assessing adequacy of deterrence to prevent war, we might also want to consider whether extreme ideology, strongly at odds with reality, may be a factor requiring higher levels of deterrence for effectiveness. One example may be the extreme ideology of Pol Pot leading him to falsely believe that his Khmer Rouge forces could defeat Vietnam.37 He apparently acted on that belief in a series of border incursions against Vietnam that ultimately produced a losing war for him. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's 9/11 attack against America, hopelessly at odds with the reality of his defeating the Western World and producing for him a strategic disaster, seems to have been prompted by his extreme ideology rooted in a distorted concept of Islam at war with the enlightenment. The continuing suicide bombings against Israel, encouraged by radical rejectionists and leading to less and less for the Palestinians, may be another example. If extreme ideology is a factor to be considered in assessing levels of deterrence, it does not mean that deterrence is doomed to fail in such settings but only that it must be at higher levels (and properly targeted on the relevant decision elites behind the specific attacks) to be effective, as is also true in perceived loss or compellance settings.38 Even if major war in the modern world is predominantly a result of aggression by nondemocratic regimes, it does not mean that all nondemocracies pose a risk of war all, or even some, of the time. Salazar's Portugal did not commit aggression. Nor today do Singapore or Bahrain or countless other nondemocracies pose a threat. That is, today nondemocracy comes close to a necessary condition in generating the high risk behavior leading to major interstate war. But it is, by itself, not a sufficient condition for war. The many reasons for this, of course, include a plethora of internal factors, such as differences in leadership perspectives and values, size of military, and relative degree of the rule of law, as well as levels of external deterrence.39 But where an aggressive nondemocratic regime is present and poses a credible military threat, then it is the totality of external factors, that is, deterrence, that become crucial.

## 1AC Relations

Bilateral initiatives like the plan are key to solve relations – its on the brink now

O’Neil 13 Shannon O'Neil is Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “U.S. Exports Depend on Mexico ” Latin America’s Moment January 11 <http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/01/11/u-s-exports-depend-on-mexico/>

Hidden behind the troubling headlines, however, is another, more hopeful Mexico — one undergoing rapid and widespread social, political, and economic transformation. Yes, Mexico continues to struggle with grave security threats, but it is also fostering a globally competitive marketplace, a growing middle class, and an increasingly influential pro-democracy voter base. In addition, Mexico’s ties with the United States are changing. Common interests in energy, manufacturing, and security, as well as an overlapping community formed by millions of binational families, have made Mexico’s path forward increasingly important to its northern neighbor. For most of the past century, U.S.-Mexican relations were conducted at arm’s length. That began to change, however, in the 1980s and, even more, after the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) spurred greater bilateral economic engagement and cooperation. Mexico’s democratic transition has further eased the wariness of some skeptics in Washington. Still, the U.S.-Mexican relationship is far from perfect. New bilateral policies are required, especially to facilitate the movement of people and goods across the U.S.-Mexican border. More important, the United States needs to start seeing Mexico as a partner instead of a problem.

Infrastructure investment rebalances the relationship — overcomes alternate causalities

Selee and Wilson 12 — Andrew Selee, former Visiting Professor at El Colegio de Mexico, holds a Ph.D. in Policy Studies from the University of Maryland Vice President for Programs and Senior Adviser for the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Adjunct Professor of Government at Johns Hopkins University and of International Affairs at George Washington University, an M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of California-San Diego, and a B.A. in Latin American Studies from Washington University in St. Louis, and Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, previously served as a Mexico Analyst for the U.S. Military and as a researcher at American University’s Center for North American Studies, holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University, 2012 (“Getting ready for a new era in U.S.-Mexico ties,” Global Public Square—Fareed Zakaria’s CNN blog, December 3rd, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/03/Getting-Ready-for-a-New-Era-in-U-S-Mexico-Ties/)

U.S.-Mexico relations have been dominated for the past six years by efforts to address drug trafficking and organized crime-related violence. This was the right thing to do while violence spiked in Mexico, but with a new administration in office after the swearing in of President Enrique Peña Nieto over the weekend, the time has come to re-balance the bilateral relationship. Ties tend to have the same top three items on the agenda year after year and administration after administration: immigration; drugs and violence; and trade and economic relations. Drugs and violence have dominated in recent years, and cooperation in addressing the transnational flows of drugs, arms and illicit money, as well as support for Mexico’s efforts to strengthen public security, must continue. Although the gains are still tenuous and the situation fluid, violence in Mexico does appear to have begun to decline at a national level and major advances have been made in key border cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez. Immigration dominated the early 2000's as presidents Bush and Fox sought a bilateral deal on the topic, but it has since become clear that immigration reform is first and foremost a domestic political issue in the United States. The rate of unauthorized immigration from Mexico has now dropped to historically low levels – there are at least as many leaving as arriving – which should allow for a more rational and reasoned debate on this issue in the United States. However, not since the negotiation and implementation of NAFTA in the 1990s have economic relations topped the bilateral agenda. Trade and jobs should once again top the U.S. agenda with Mexico for three main reasons. First, the economy most likely will be the top issue in both the United States and Mexico for the next several years. Economic issues were clearly the top issue for voters in the recent U.S. presidential elections, and in Mexico they matched public security as the top set of concerns. Second, by focusing on the creation of jobs and improving the competitiveness of manufacturers on both sides of the border, we can improve the tone of the relationship. We may even find that the stickier issues of security and migration become a little less intractable. Finally, the economic agenda between the two countries has the potential to yield tangible results, creating jobs and improving the competitive position of North America vis-a-vis Asia. For years, Mexico has oriented its economy toward the U.S. in hopes of harnessing the growth of the world’s most dynamic economy. Now, at a time when Mexico is growing around four percent a year – faster than the United States – Mexico can return the favor and provide a boost to the U.S. economy. Meanwhile, Mexico’s large and growing middle class has become an increasingly important market for U.S. products. As it turns out, U.S. and Mexican companies do not simply sell products to one another, they build products together, with parts zigzagging back and forth across the border as goods are manufactured. As a result, a product imported from Mexico is, on average, made of 40 percent U.S. parts and materials, meaning forty cents of every dollar spent of Mexican imports stays right here in the United States. Chinese products, in contrast, contain just four percent U.S. content. This also means the competitiveness of our two countries is closely linked, and improvements in productivity in one nation make a co-manufactured product cheaper and more competitive on the global market. That is to say, growth in Mexico or the United States will boost exports from both countries: when it comes to manufacturing, we are in it together. To produce results, the U.S.-Mexico economic agenda needs substance, and there is plenty to do. To start out, we must make the southwest border more efficient without sacrificing security. Today, long and unpredictable wait times act as a type of border tax, cutting away at manufacturers’ competitiveness a bit more each time they send goods across the border. Since we manufacture and export together, the United States should also join forces with Mexico and Canada in designing and implementing a global trade strategy. The first step is robust cooperation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, but the end goal must be to expand the agreement until countries like China and India feel they will lose out if they do not join in. The countries could also tackle ways of making customs procedures more efficient, ensuring regulatory frameworks are compatible, and integrating our transportation and logistics networks to keep up with regional manufacturers, who have already integrated production. In the end, it is a matter of perspective. If Mexico is seen more as a business partner than a source of intractable problems, a whole range of policy options that were previously considered too risky to be tried will be within reach. If such a change in perception occurs, the results will speak for themselves.

Plan is reverse-causal – flashpoints of border disagreement make future collapse inevitable

Baker Institute 9 — The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University—a nonpartisan public policy think tank, 2009 (“Developing the U.S.-Mexico Border Region for a Prosperous and Secure Relationship,” Baker Institute Policy Report, Number 38, April, Available Online at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/LAI-pub-BorderSecPREnglish-041509.pdf)

The relationship between the United States and Mexico has historically been a strong one, but internal politics in both countries today are preventing a potentially closer and more productive alliance. Problems at the border loom large in the political calculation of decision makers both in Washington, D.C., and Mexico City. Daily news reports seem to imply that problems developing at the border stand to derail common goals. However, it is our contention that the exact opposite is true. Creative localized solutions to the challenging set of issues that surround the U.S.–Mexico border could hold the key to building a stronger overall bilateral partnership and constructive joint future, rather than serve as the flashpoint for tensions between the two neighbors. Both Mexican President Felipe Calderón and U.S. President Barack Obama have a unique opportunity in the next four years to advance common goals such as economic prosperity and security. This report on the U.S.–Mexico border aims to aid policymakers in forging stronger and sustainable U.S.–Mexico bilateral relations with the use of more coordinated approaches to border issues. Sponsored by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University in Houston, Texas, this study investigates the important role of border institutions, civil society, cross-border transnational populations, and localized, small-scale problem-solving as a first defense against the deteriorating conditions at the border—be they humanitarian, economic, or security-related. By better understanding life along each side of the U.S.–Mexico border, we hope to demonstrate the great potential of this vibrant region to play a positive role in both the U.S. and Mexican economies and intertwined transnational communities. Rather than represent a zero-sum unilateral dilemma, the border can be a stepping stone toward a lasting friendship between the United States and Mexico, and positively influence citizens on both sides of the boundary. The border should be where one can best see the benefits for the two countries of collaborating and cooperating on issues of major concern. Instead, the border is increasingly becoming an area of tension, conflict, and unilateral policies and actions that are more likely to hinder, rather than promote, common goals.

Two internal links to terrorism

1. Method cooperation — response and communication

Rosales et al 11- MD has worked in the health arena for more than 20 years and in public health over 15 years, after serving five years as Director, Office of Border Health for the Arizona Department of Health Services. Dr. Rosales has expertise in program development and implementation, public health administration, policy and health disparities research in the Southwest, (Cecilia, “U.S.Mexico cross-border workforce training needs:survey implementation”, January 2011, Journal of Injury and Violence Research at Kermanshah University of Medical Sciences, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3134923/>,)

Abinational border-wide, online assessment on preparedness/emergency response and workforce training needs of personnel dedicated to the U.S.-Mexico border region was ommissioned by the ten U.S.-Mexico border state health offices through the U.S.-Mexico Border Governor’s Conference. The overarching goal of the study was to provide the Border States with information that could serve to orient, train, and evaluate the workforce charged with public health emergency preparedness and response as well as future preparedness personnel. The primary objective of the study was to assess and prioritize bioterrorism, infectious disease, and border training needs critical for responding to intentional and unintentional emergencies along the border region. The study was to describe the characteristics, learning preferences, proficiency and educational needs of the emergency preparedness and response workforce operating in the counties located in the U.S. border area. This area was defined by the La Paz Agreement and Public Law 103-400 (U.S. – Mexico Border Health Commission) as 100 kilometers north and south of the international boundary. The relative lack of literature addressing U.S.-Mexico cross-border issues related to emergency preparedness and bioterrorism highlights the importance of this assessment. This study describes and provides results of the assessment conducted with the four U.S. Border States and two Mexico Border States. While the study was mandated for all ten states funding was only provided for border cities within six states. Funding of transborder studies has been challenging for researchers focused on border health issues. The state of Sonora, sister state to Arizona, and the state of Chihuahua, sister state to Texas, were both successful in securing the resources to survey the preparedness and response workforce.

2. LPOE protection prevents infiltration – it’s a hotspot of cooperation

Mariclaire Acosta et al 12 – Project Director, Freedom House – Mexico Bill Bratton Chairman, Kroll Advisory Solutions, former Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department and former New York City Police Commissioner Geoffrey Cowan President, The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands John Engler President, Business Roundtable, former Governor of Michigan Rafael Fernández de Castro Chair, Department of International Studies, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, former Foreign Policy Advisor to President Calderón Michael Govan CEO and Wallis Annenberg Director, Los Angeles County Museum of Art Jane Harman Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center, former Member of Congress Carlos Heredia Director of International Studies, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, CIDE, former Member of Congress Phil Heymann James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, former Deputy Attorney General Barry Jackson Chief of Staff to the Speaker of the House John Boehner Enrique Krauze Historian and Essayist, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Letras Libres Isaac Lee President, News, Univision Communications Inc. Emilio Lozoya Chairman, JFH Lozoya Investments Mel Martinez Chairman, Florida, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean for JPMorgan Chase & Co., Chairman, JPMorgan Chase Foundation Doris Meissner Senior Fellow, Migration Policy Institute, former Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service, (“Policy Recommendations for U.S.-Mexico Relations”, <http://sunnylands.org/files/posts/159/stronger_f.pdf>, AW)

At the same time, the United States faces a major challenge in ensuring the safety of its citizens against terrorist attacks, and it depends significantly on intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation from its two neighbors, Mexico and Canada. Indeed, this cooperation has been one of the untold stories of engagement between U.S. and Mexican federal agencies over the past decade, with the result that the U.S.-Mexico border has not yet been used for terrorist activities. However, continued vigilance and more sophisticated forms of cooperation will be needed to avoid the evolving threats from terrorist organizations. Policy oPtion: Develop border ports of entry that ensure safety and strengthen trade by employing risk-management techniques and the latest technology. Indeed, one of the greatest opportunities for binational cooperation on security, which would help address both Mexican concerns about transnational organized crime and U.S. concerns about terrorism, would be to develop more sophisticated approaches to managing ports of entry at the border. By using risk management techniques and the latest technology, the two countries could develop more effective ways of detecting potential threats, ranging from drugs to firearms to bombs, and simultaneously facilitate commerce and the exchange of people across the border. While much attention has been focused on beefing up security between ports of entry, the reality is that most of the real threats to the two countries are at the ports of entry rather than between them. A new focus on these could be a win-win for both countries and for both security and trade. Cooperation on Global Issues and Foreign Policy For the United States, Mexico is a key partner in international affairs. Mexico works hard to protect the United States from terrorist threats and to weaken transnational organized crime groups. It is a middle income country, currently holds the presidency of the G-20, and is expected to grow steadily for many years to come. Jim O’Neil of Goldman Sachs, for example, expects Mexico to have the seventh largest economy in the world by 2020. Mexico has long served as a bridge between the developed and developing worlds, and the U.S. can take advantage of this fact by working closely with Mexico on issues of common interest.

Border is a key area for counter-terrorism – here are 7518 reasons

Murdock 4/25, Deroy Murdock, Media Fellow of The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, nationally syndicated columnist with the Scripps Howard News Service, 4/25/13, (“The Southern Border: Our Welcome Mat for Terrorists”, <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/346591/southern-border-our-welcome-mat-terrorists>, AW)

There are at least 7,518 reasons to get the U.S./Mexican border under control. That equals the number of aliens apprehended in fiscal year 2011 from the four nations the U.S. government labels “state sponsors of terrorism” and ten additional “countries of interest.” Since January 2010, those flying into America via these 14 nations face enhanced screening; as the Transportation Security Administration announced, “Effective aviation security must begin beyond our borders.” U.S. national security merits at least that much vigilance on our borders.

The roaring immigration-reform debate this year largely addresses Hispanic aliens who illegally cross the border. Far more worrisome, however, are the thousands who break into America from countries “where we have concerns, particularly about al-Qaeda affiliates,” a top State Department official told CNN.

These include Cubans, Iranians, Sudanese, and Syrians whose governments are federally designated “state sponsors of terrorism.” As indicated by the latest information in Table 34 of Customs and Border Protection’s Immigration Yearbook 2011, 198 Sudanese were nabbed while penetrating the USA. Between FY 2002 and 2011, there were 1,207 such arrests. (These figures cover all U.S. borders, although, as Table 35 confirms, 96.3 percent of the overall detainee population intruded from Mexico.) Like other immigrants, most Sudanese seek better lives here. But some may be vectors for the same militant Islam that literally tore Sudan in two.

In FY 2011, 108 Syrians were stopped at our borders; over ten years, the number is 1,353. Syria is a key supporter of Hezbollah, and Bashar Assad’s unstable regime reportedly has attacked its domestic opponents with chemical weapons.

As for Iranians, 276 were caught in FY 2011, while 2,310 were captured over the previous ten years. Iran also backs Hezbollah, hates “the Great Satan,” and craves atomic weapons.

The other ten “countries of interest” are Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and:

Afghanistan: The Taliban’s stronghold and current theater of America’s longest war. Afghans halted in FY 2011: 106. Prior ten fiscal years: 681.

Nigeria: The land of underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab suffers under sharia law in its northern provinces. Respective data: 591, 4,525.

Pakistan: Hideaway of the Pakistani Taliban and the late Osama bin Laden. 525, 10,682.

Saudi Arabia: Generous benefactor of radical imams and militant mosques worldwide; birthplace of 15 of the 19 September 11 hijackers. 123, 986.

Somalia: Home of Indian Ocean pirates and al-Qaeda’s al-Shabaab franchise. In October 1993, Islamic terrorists there shot down two Black Hawk helicopters, killed 18 U.S. soldiers, and dragged several of their bodies through Mogadishu’s streets. 323, 1,524.

At a Capitol Hill hearing last July, Homeland Security secretary Janet Napolitano conceded that terrorists enter the U.S. via the U.S./Mexican border “from time to time.”

The House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight last November published A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence, and Terror at the Southwest Border. As this study explained:

The Congressional Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected.

A Line in the Sand offers chilling portraits of some who treat the southern border as America’s welcome mat.

• On January 11, 2011, U.S. agents discovered Said Jaziri in a car trunk trying to enter near San Diego. Said said that he had traveled from his native Tunisia to Tijuana and paid smugglers $5,000 to sneak him across the border. The French government previously convicted and deported Jaziri for assaulting a Muslim whom he considered insufficiently devout. In 2006, Jaziri advocated killing Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard for creating what Jaziri called sacrilegious drawings of the Prophet Mohammed.

• Somalia’s Ahmed Muhammed Dhakane told authorities in 2011 that he earned up to $75,000 per day smuggling East Africans into America. His clients included three al-Shabaab terrorists. As the House report states: “Dhakane cautioned that each of these individuals is ready to die for their cause and would fight against the United States if the jihad moved from overseas to the U.S. mainland.”

• On June 4, 2010, Anthony Joseph Tracy (a.k.a. Yusuf Noor) was convicted of conspiring to slip aliens into America. Tracy told federal investigators that Cuban diplomats used his travel agency in Kenya — Noor Services Ltd. — to transfer 272 Somalis to Havana. They proceeded to Belize, through Mexico, and then trespassed into the U.S. Tracy, who converted to Islam in prison in the 1990s, claims he refused to assist al-Shabaab. But officials discovered an e-mail in which he casually wrote: “i helped a lot of Somalis and most are good but there are some who are bad and i leave them to ALLAH . . . ”

High risk – no tech barriers

Kenneth C. **Brill 12**, is a former U.S. ambassador to the I.A.E.A. Kenneth N. Luongo is president of the Partnership for Global Security. Both are members of the Fissile Material Working Group, a nonpartisan nongovernmental organization. Nuclear Terrorism: A Clear Danger, www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html?\_r=0

Terrorists exploit gaps in security. The current global regime for protecting the nuclear materials that terrorists desire for their ultimate weapon is far from seamless. It is based largely on unaccountable, voluntary arrangements that are inconsistent across borders. Its weak links make it **dangerous** and inadequate to prevent nuclear terrorism**.** Later this month in Seoul, the more than 50 world leaders who will gather for the second Nuclear Security Summit need to seize the opportunity to start developing an accountable regime to prevent nuclear terrorism. There is a **consensus** among international leaders that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real, not a Hollywood confection. President Obama, the leaders of 46 other nations, the heads of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, and numerous experts have called nuclear terrorism one of the most serious threats to global security and stability. It is also **preventable with more aggressive action**. At least four terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, have demonstrated interest in using a nuclear device. These groups operate in or near states with histories of questionable nuclear security practices. Terrorists do not need to steal a nuclear weapon. It is quite possible to make an improvised nuclear device from highly enriched uranium or plutonium being used for civilian purposes. And there is a black market in such material. There have been 18 confirmed thefts or loss of weapons-usable nuclear material. In 2011, the Moldovan police broke up part of a smuggling ring attempting to sell highly enriched uranium; one member is thought to remain at large with a kilogram of this material.

Biological terrorist attack causes extinction

Kellman ‘08[Barry, Director of the International Weapons Control Center at the DePaul University College of Law and author of Bioviolence—Preventing Biological Terror and Crime; “Bioviolence: A Growing Threat,” The Futurist, May-June 2008, http://www.wfs.org/March-April09/MJ2008\_Kellman.pdf]

What Might Bioviolence Accomplish? Envision a series of attacks against capitals of developing states that have close diplomatic linkages with the United States. The attacks would carry a well-publicized yet simple warning: “If you are a friend of the United States, receive its officials, or support its policies, thousands of your people will get sick.” How many attacks in how many cities would it take before international diplomacy, to say nothing of international transit, comes to a crashing halt? In comparison to use of conventional or chemical weapons, the potential death toll of a bioattack could be huge. Although the number of victims would depend on where an attack takes place, the type of pathogen, and the sophistication of the weapons maker, there is widespread consensus among experts that a heightened attack would inflict casualties exceedable only by nuclear weapons. In comparison to nuclear weapons, bioweapons are far easier and cheaper to make and transport, and they can be made in facilities that are far more difficult to detect. The truly unique characteristic of certain bioweapons that distinguishes them from every other type of weapon is contagion. No other type of weapon can replicate itself and spread. Any other type of attack, no matter how severe, occurs at a certain moment in time at an identifiable place. If you aren’t there, you are angry and upset but not physically injured by the attack. An attack with a contagious agent can uniquely spread, potentially imperiling target populations far from where the agents are released. A bio-offender could infect his minions with a disease and send them across borders before symptoms are obvious. Carriers will then spread it to other unsuspecting victims who would themselves become extended bioweapons, carrying the disease indiscriminately. There are challenges in executing such an attack, but fanatical terrorist organizations seem to have an endless supply of willing suicide attackers. All this leads to the most important characteristic of bioviolence: It raises incomparable levels of panic. Contagious bioviolence means that planes fly empty or perhaps don’t fly at all. People cancel vacation and travel plans and refuse to interact with each other for fear of unseen affliction. Public entertainment events are canceled; even going to a movie becomes too dangerous. Ultimately, bioviolence is about hiding our children as everyone becomes vulnerable to our most fundamental terror: the fear of disease. For people who seek to rattle the pillars of modern civilization and perhaps cause it to collapse, effective use of disease would set in motion political, economic, and health consequences so severe as to call into question the ability of existing governments to maintain their citizens’ security. In an attack’s wake, no one would know when it is over, and no government could credibly tell an anxious population where and when it is safe to resume normal life. While it is difficult to specify when this danger will strike, there should be no doubt that we are vulnerable to a rupture. Just as planes flying into the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, instantly became a historical marker dividing strategic perspectives before from after, the day that disease is effectively used as an instrument of hate will profoundly change everything. If you want to stop modern civilization in its tracks, bioviolence is the way to go. The notion that no one will ever commit catastrophic bioviolence is simply untenable.

Nuclear terrorism causes extinction –escalates to Russia and China

Ayson 10 – Robert Ayson 10, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible thatsome sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors**.** Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhapsIran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan**.** But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism(as discussed earlier)Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

#  2AC

## 2AC – Case

### 2AC – Topline

No impact to this

David Mathieson and, Associate Fellow at FRIDE. He holds a doctorate from the University of London, Richard Youngs 6, Co-ordinator of the Democratisation programme at FRIDE, and lecturer at the University of Warwick, “Democracy Promotion and the European Left: Ambivalence Confused?”, December, working paper 29 at FRIDE

Equally important, leftist

AND

during the 1990s.

### 2AC – Disease Prodict

Securitized rhetoric of disease is good – only way to create an effective public response

Selgelid and Enemark 08 (Michael J, Christian. (Senior Research Fellow for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics. Enemark is Lecturer in International Security, U of Sydney, and Visiting Fellow at John Curtin School of Medical Research ) “Infectious Diseases, Security and Ethics: The Case of HIV/AIDS” Bioethics Volume 22, Number 9 pp 457-465)

The passage in 2000

AND

countries severely affected’.3

### 2AC – Deterrence Good

Deterrence is an impact turns all their arguments

Lupovici 8 (Amir Lupovici, a post-doctoral Fellow at the Munk Centre for International Studies at University of Toronto, text taken from paper titled, “Why the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse,” presented at the Canadian Political Science Association’s annual conference, held June 4th to 6th, 2008. Text found at [http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf])

Introduction Recent years

AND

security and deterrence.

Deterrence creates effective peace

Moore 4—chaired law prof, UVA. Frm first Chairman of the Board of the US Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on Int Law to the Dept. of State (John, Beyond the Democratic Peace, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341, Lexis)

If major interstate war

AND

increased or decreased?

### 2AC – A2 – Gulli

Historical data proves that hegemony solves conflict and the alternative is far more violent

Schweller, 11 [After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline, Randall L. Schweller, ull Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University, where he has taught since 1994. He earned his PhD from Columbia University in 1993 and was as an Olin Fellow at Harvard University in 1993-94, After Unipolarity Randall L. Schweller and China’s Visions of International Order in Xiaoyu Pu an Era of U.S. Decline, p. Project Muse]

History tells us

AND

the international crisis

## 2AC – Security

### 2AC – Framework

Role of the ballot’s to simulate enactment of the plan – key to decisionmaking and fairness

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

During this phase

AND

 modern technological society.61

Governmental engagement is key – without policy the alt can never solve

McClean 01 (David, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope” [www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm](http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm))

Leftist American culture

AND

so-called "managerial class."

Prioritization claims are counter-productive and illogical – you should evaluate the veracity of the 1ac’s claims about the world while embracing a plurality of (methods / ontologies / theories)

Andrew Bennett 13, government prof at Georgetown, The mother of all isms: Causal mechanisms and structured pluralism in International Relations theory, European Journal of International Relations 2013 19:459

The political science

AND

of IR's ingrown 'isms.'

Util is the only moral framework

Murray 97 (Alastair, Professor of Politics at U. of Wales-Swansea, Reconstructing Realism, p. 110) THIS EVIDENE IS GENDER EDITED

Weber emphasised that

AND

ethical judgements altogether'.13

### 2AC – A2 – Jackson

Discursive othering doesn’t result in ‘uncontrollable violence’

Rodwell 5—PhD candidate, Manchester Met. (Jonathan, Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson, http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm)

In this response

AND

a heuristic model.

### 2AC – Terror Prodict

The alt can’t solve the case

Jean Bethke Elshtain, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics, Divinity School, The University of Chicago, with appointments in Political Science and the Committee on International Relations, 2003, Just War Against Terror, p. 22-3

Without in any way

AND

disarm radical Islamism.

Our evidence is epistemologically rigorous

Boyle 08 Michael J. Boyle, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, Critical Studies On Terrorism, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64, Taylor and Francis

Jackson (2007c) calls for

AND

its own work.

### 2AC – Epistemology Topshelf

They’ve overdetermined the role of epistemology – even if threats are socially constructed, that construction is still real. Their critical authors are equally guilty of the same epistemological bias and you should reject the neg’s methodology for not being specific enough to 1ac claims

Lipshutz 2011– Prof of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, speaking after hearing a policy debate in which the affirmative read a straight up policy aff and the negative read a security criticism (Ronnie, Speaking about the final round at the California Round Robin, Feb 18, Accessed here: <http://nfltv.org/2011/02/24/cal-round-robin-policy/>)

RONNIE LIPSCHUTZ: Well, many

AND

Bourdieu. I’m done.

### 2AC – Link Turn

The plan gives security transformative potential --- alt alone fails and their impact is false

Nunes, 12 [Reclaiming the political: Emancipation and critique in security studies, João Nunes, Security Dialogue 2012 43: 345,Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK, p. sage publications]

In the works of

AND

understandings of security.

### 2AC – Security Perm Card

Alt is woefully insufficient to achieve empancipation from security – also proves that the perm is key to institutional reform – we can sever certain representations – they have to prove the whole plan is a bad idea

McCormack 10 (Tara, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 59-61)

In chapter 7

AND

circumstances of the time.

### 2AC – Threats Real/Fear Good

Threats real and not constructed—rational risk assessment goes aff

Knudsen 1– PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn (Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue 32:3)

Moreover, I have

AND

for dealing with them.

Apocalypticism is good---causes productive change

Bruce Tonn 6 – Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee, and Jenna Tonn, Department of the History of Science, Harvard University – Futures 41 (2009) 760–765 – obtained via Science Direct

This discussion

AND

state of the world.

### 2AC – Security Alt Fails

Desecuritization is not emancipatory---it’s worse for every tangible impact they isolate

Nunes 7 – Joao Reis Nunes, Marie Curie Fellow and Ph. D. Candidate in International Politics at University of Wales, Aberystwyth, September 2007, “Politics, Security, Critical Theory: A Contribution to Current Debates on Security,” online: <http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Nunes-joaonunes-politicssecuritycriticaltheory.pdf>

Yet, not all of

AND

[CSS=Critical Security Studies]

The alt fails – destructive genealogy pre-configures the terms of debate and paralyzes politics

Lewandowski, political theory – Charles University, ‘94

(Joseph, Philosophy and Social Criticism 20:109, Review Essay)

While the attempt

AND

Heidegger and Criticism.

The alternative’s totalizing rejection won’t spillover – prefer specific impacts

Perkin, professor of English – Saint Mary’s University, ‘93

(J. Russell, “Review Essay: Theorizing the Culture Wars,” Postmodern Culture, Vol. 3, No. 3)

The genealogy Spanos

AND

perpetuates a myth

# 1AR

### 1AR – Structural Violence Card

Their conception of violence is reductive and can’t be solved

Boulding 77 (Kenneth E. Boulding Reviewed workJournal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), pp. 75-Economist, educator, peace activist, He graduated from Oxford University, and was granted United States citizenship in 1948. During the years 1949 to 1967, he was a faculty member of the University of Michigan)

Finally, we come

AND

finding the answer.

### 1AR – Ontology Not First

Ontology is inevitable and not first

Gathman 9 <http://limitedinc.blogspot.com/2009/10/dialectics-of-diddling.html> Professional editor, translator, publishes pieces in salon.com and Austin Chronicle

IT – and I will

AND

political than this.

### 1AR – Reps Don’t Cause War

Reps don’t cause war

Reiter 95 DAN REITER is a Professor of Political Science at Emory University and has been an Olin post-doctoral fellow in security studies at Harvard “Exploring the Powder Keg Myth” International Security v20 No2 Autumn 1995 pp 5-34 JSTOR

A criticism of assessing

AND

results of such a test.

### 1AR – Kappler

Instrumental affirmation of a policy through role-playing is a prerequisite to liberal democratic participation

Rawls ‘99

John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 1999, p. 56-57

To answer this

AND

understanding among peoples.

Now is key to shape the next generation – must engage positively in the political system

Langman ’12 Langman, professor of sociology at Loyola University Chicago, Fall 2012

(Lauren, “Why Obama Will Win the Election . . . and the Left Should Hope So,” http://logosjournal.com/2012/fall\_langma/)

As has been argued,

AND

a Democratic administration.